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ABST RACT
The practice of physical medicine underwent a sea change at the turn of
the 20th century, but the management of mental disorders stayed much
the same as it had been since Rome. New names have been coined for
disorders, and synthetic drugs are advertised as a solution to every
problem, but the causes are still largely unknown and, although
spontaneous remission can occur, there are no cures. This review of
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment from Rome to the 21st century offers
a rationale to support the classic (and still current) classification of
disorders. It offers a method of distinguishing the major kinds of
disorders and suggests when the prescription of psychoactive drugs
may—or may not—be appropriate.

Introduction
The practice of physical medicine underwent a sea
change at the turn of the 20th century, yet the management
of mental disorders has stayed much the same as it had been
since Rome. New names have been coined for disorders,
and synthetic drugs are advertised as a solution to every
problem, but the causes are still unknown and, although
spontaneous remission can occur, there are no cures. This
review of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment from Rome
to the 21st century offers a rationale to support the classic
(and still current) classification of disorders. It offers a
method of distinguishing the major kinds of disorders and
suggests when the prescription of psychoactive drugs
may—or may not—be appropriate.
The 21st century diagnosis and treatment of mental
disorders is—like the weather—much the same as it was in
Rome 2,000 years ago. The categories of disorders
recognized in antiquity are still the basis of psychiatric
diagnosis, and management is still limited to symptom
control. Too often this is accomplished through the use of
potentially addictive drugs whose subjective effects cannot
be measured on any objective scale. By contrast, the
treatment of physical diseases, such as diabetes and
malaria, involves the use of medicines with objective
effects that can and must be measured and monitored [1,2].
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Thirty years ago, Paul D. MacLean, MD (1913-2007)
identified three relatively discrete levels of mental
operations and devised a system that could revolutionize
modern psychiatry. Some functions, he said, are basic,
genetically linked, unconscious, and durable. The bulk of
human mental activity—such as the ability to learn and
recall—takes place at a largely subconscious intermediate
level. Human intellect—consciousness, reason, and
judgment—is at what MacLean called an advanced and
probably unique feature of the human mind. The MacLean
classification provides a rationale for the historical (and
current) categories of disorders as personality patterns,
neuroses, schizophrenias, and mood disorders, and it
suggests the most appropriate treatments for each.
Most of MacLean’s contemporaries dismissed his map,
saying the brains of all mammals are anatomically similar,
which is true but irrelevant. Mammals also share the same
basic skeleton, but bats and giraffes arrange and use that
skeleton in quite different ways. Mammalian brains all
have much the same anatomy, but mental abilities are
variable. Rabbits are able to survive, find food, and
reproduce; dogs are smarter and learn complicated tricks.
Yet only human beings are conscious of time and capable
of contemplating future possibilities. In any case, MacLean
was not writing about the anatomy of the brain, but about
the functions of the mind [1,2].
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Discussions
Mental disorders have been recognized at least since
Hippocrates (460-375 BCE) who is traditionally credited
with the diagnosis of hysteria (excitability with
impairment of sensation or movement). Hippocrates
believed hysteria was caused by a wandering uterus (Gk
hystera, womb), getting stuck where it should not be, an
accepted explanation until well into the 19th century.
The most influential physician of all time must be
Roman physician Claudius Galen (130-210 CE), who
produced a body of work that Western physicians followed
until the end of the 19th century. Galen, who was personal
physician to three consecutive Roman Emperors, followed
an idea attributed to Hippocrates: that the body contained
four fluids or humors—red (blood), white (phlegm),
yellow (bile), and black (unknown). The predominant
humor produced a person who could be described as
sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, or melancholic (melena,
black + chole). Disease, according to Galen, was due to an
imbalance of humors. Madness and melancholia, for
instance, called for laxatives to rid the body of the black
humor (whatever it might have been), or in the most severe
cases, bleeding to cool an overheated brain [3].
Galen taught, and physicians for centuries believed,
that there were two kinds of blood (the red humor), and
each was distributed in a one-way system. The liver
produced dark red blood and sent it to the heart, where it
mixed with air from the lungs to be burned and maintain
body temperature. Combustion produced bright red blood
and a pneuma (air, spirit) that rose through the carotid
arteries to the brain (arteries are empty after death).
Bleeding reduced the available fuel and was therefore the
logical treatment for an overheated brain.
In 1628, English physician William Harvey (15781657) proved that blood circulates in a loop rather than in
two separate channels, but medicine is a conservative
profession, and physicians continued to bleed their patients
for another two centuries. American physician Benjamin
Rush (1745-1813) was a firm believer in bleeding. During
a 1793 yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia, Rush bled
several thousand patients and probably killed many of
those who might otherwise have survived. The American
Psychiatric Association calls Rush the Father of American
Psychiatry and his image is on the cover of the American
Journal of Psychiatry (before 1921, the American Journal
of Insanity) [1,4].
Galen’s treatments were intended to restore humoral
balance and should be of sufficient potency to convince the
patient they were effective. Noga Arikha says sometimes
they were. Doctors had a ready excuse when treatment
failed. Arnaud de Villeneuve (ca. 1235-1312) advised
physicians to just mention obstruction because they do not
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understand what it means, and it helps greatly that a term
is not understood by the people.
Most people had only rare access to physicians and they
found natural or botanical drugs to relieve emotional
distress. There are two varieties of psychoactive drugs, the
sedative/analgesics such as opium, and stimulants
including nicotine and cocaine alkaloids. Psychoactive
drugs are almost invariably pleasant and can easily turn
relief into addiction. Nothing is always addictive, of
course; many people drink alcohol, only a few become
alcoholics; some people quit smoking with relative ease,
while others resume smoking after cancer surgery.
In 1844, an Italian civil servant named Agostino Bassi
(1773-1856) suggested that microscopic organisms
(germs) might cause diseases. Physicians were highly
skeptical, but in 1885, French chemist Louis Pasteur (18221895) created a successful rabies vaccine and proved the
Germ Theory. That brought about massive change in the
practice of medicine at the end of the 19th century [2,5].
The germ theory forced doctors to abandon Galen’s
humors and look for the real causes of diseases. They were
surprised to find that at least one well-known disease,
dropsy (shortness of breath and edema), was not a disease
at all, but rather a syndrome that could be the result of
several different diseases. A syndrome is a set of symptoms
that seem to occur together, and today dropsy is just an
interesting footnote in medical texts.
When the cause of a disease—the target of treatment—
is known, treatment can be focused and cure is possible.
With that in mind, the International Statistical Commission
asked Jacques Bertillon (1851-1922) to develop a method
of classifying diseases to enable statistical comparison. In
1893, he produced the Bertillon Classification of Causes of
Death, which is the precursor of the modern International
Statistical Classification of Diseases (ICD) [6].
No edition of the ICD, during the first 50 years of
publication, listed mental disorders. Psychiatric or
functional disorders are syndromes, like dropsy, and
statistical evaluation of treatment is impossible when the
target of treatment has not been identified. American
psychiatrists, feeling excluded from the general practice of
medicine, petitioned for the inclusion of their diagnoses,
but were refused. The situation changed after European
psychiatry had been devastated in World War II. The
United Nations (UN) was founded in 1946 and
commissioned the World Health Organization (WHO) to
assume publication of the sixth edition of the ICD, which
was the first to include a section of mental disorders [6].
American psychiatrists were unfortunately not entirely
satisfied with the new international nomenclature. They
were, in fact, not even in agreement with each other. There
were three diagnostic systems—the Standard, Armed
Forces, and Veterans Administration—in use. The
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American Psychiatric Association (APA) reached a
consensus in 1951 and published a unified nomenclature in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM). That gave the Association the right to coin new
names, and new ones proliferated [7].
The word insanity had been used as a description of
madness and melancholia since the early 1600s, but that
term was abandoned after the 1843 trial of an illiterate Scot
who thought the British government intended to kill him.
Daniel McNaughton (there are various spellings), in what
he thought was self-defense, shot at Prime Minister Robert
Peel, but hit and killed the Minister’s secretary instead.
McNaughton was tried for murder but found not guilty
by reason of insanity. Queen Victoria was displeased with
what she considered undue leniency, and demanded a
definition of insanity. Her cabinet debated and eventually
devised one, called the McNaughton Rule. According to
the Rule, a person should be judged sane and ready to be
judged unless at the time of committing the act, the accused
was laboring under a defect of reason so as not to
understand the nature and quality of the act or, if the
defendant did know it, did the defendant not know that the
act was wrong? That legal definition made insanity a legal
diagnosis, and psychiatrists felt obliged to find other words
to describe the problem [1,2].
Carl Friedrich Constatt (1807-1850) is believed to have
coined the word psychosis. The American Psychiatric
Association later abandoned that word, saying it has
historically received a number of different definitions,
none of which has achieved universal acceptance. The lack
of a clear definition could apply to all of the other
psychiatric diagnoses, not one of which can be proved (or
disproved) by any objective evidence [8].
German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926)
preferred to maintain the classic separation of two major
categories (madness and melancholia) and suggested
dementia praecox (premature dementia) and mania as
better descriptions of psychosis. Swiss psychiatrist Paul
Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) preferred schizophrenia (L.
split + mind) to dementia praecox, and that has become the
more popular word. The diagnosis of mania has been more
extensively reworked and become an extensive list of
mood disorders. Some of these 19th century coinages—
such as schizophrenia and clinical depression—have
entered the vernacular and are widely discussed as if they
were verified entities, even though not all psychiatrists
agree on just what the words mean [2,9].
The first edition of the DSM gave more modern names
to the disorders that Galen described. Inherent personality
characteristics were listed as Personality disorders. The
classic syndrome of hysteria was initially classified as a
Psychoneurotic Disorder (eventually to become one of
several neuroses), and Galen’s madness and melancholia

became two kinds of Psychotic Disorders called
schizophrenic and affective reactions. Despite impressive
new names, the causes of emotional distress are as
mysterious today as they were to Galen [7, 10].
In 1987, the revised Third Edition of the DSM listed 29
names for schizophrenias, and 40 kinds of affective
reactions. These new names have little if any clinical value;
the APA has admitted there is no assumption that each
category of mental disorder is a completely discrete entity
with absolute boundaries dividing it from other mental
disorders or from no mental disorder [11].
The identification of what was causing many diseases
led to a 20th century revolution in physical medicine.
Bleeding as a prime treatment for madness
(schizophrenias) was abandoned, and psychiatrists seem to
have thought newer methods were in order. Portuguese
neurologist Antonio Egas Moniz (1874-1955) was
awarded the Nobel Prize for his discovery of the
therapeutic value of leucotomy (severance of the frontal
lobes from the rest of the brain) in certain psychoses.
Manfred J. Sakel (1900-1957) used insulin to induce deep
coma as a way of encouraging the brain to reorganize
itself. In 1937, Ugo Cerletti (1887-1963) used an apparatus
to induced epileptic-like seizures and reported that a patient
who had delusions and hallucinations was able to return to
normal life following electroshock therapy. In 1949, Dr.
John Cade (1912-1980) experimented with lithium salts as
a means of controlling mania. Unfortunately, there is no
means of objectively measuring the clinical effectiveness
of any of these methods [12].
The more common symptoms of internal conflict,
including anxiety, panic, and depression, can be the result
of any number of problems. Any or all of these symptoms
can be due to an inherent predisposition, anticipated or real
loss, a symptom of inner conflict, the loss of reason, or
perhaps something as yet unknown. These symptoms can
relatively easily be suppressed by psychoactive drugs, but
symptom relief does not identify cause; aspirin relieves
pain, but no one thinks aspirin corrects a chemical
imbalance, or believes that pain is the result of aspirin
deficiency. And the use of psychoactive drugs often risks
the possibility of abuse, addiction, even overdose and death
[1, 2].
Doctors usually try to avoid the prescription of
symptom-blockers before the cause of the problem is
identified, because the suppression of symptoms may delay
finding the cause of the problem. Unfortunately, symptom
management is the psychiatrist’s only option, even though
it may discourage search for causes and add addiction to
the problem.
Unnecessarily obscure and esoteric terminology coined
by, for, and perhaps understood only by psychiatrists seems
to suggest that functional (or psychiatric) disorders are
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treatable diseases. That enables the pharmaceutical
industry to promote symptom-blocking drugs as if they
were medicines and may encourage the use of drugs where
they are not needed [2].
The pharmaceutical industry developed out of the 19th
century discovery of aniline dyes, of which two —
Mercurochrome and Gentian violet—kill germs on contact.
That suggested the possibility that other chemicals might
be useful in the treatment of disease. Mercurochrome has
been banned and is no longer available [13].
German chemist Adolf von Baeyer (1835-1917)
synthesized barbituric acid in 1864, but there was no
medical use for it. Before long, however, research on
similar compounds produced an effective sedative,
phenobarbital. The Bayer Company (founded in 1863 by
Friedrich Bayer) marketed phenobarbital as Luminal in
1912. The industry was subsequently able to produce and
sell several other derivatives of barbituric acid, and
barbiturates were widely prescribed, profitable, and
popular as street drugs as well [14].
The American government prohibited the production,
sale, or distribution of opium in 1914, two years after the
introduction of the first synthetic substitute, Luminal. A
commercial derivative of opium, Heroin, remained
available for another ten years. Several more powerful
chemically enhanced forms of opium (opioids) are
available today under trade names including Vicodin,
Lorcet, Dilaudid, Percocet, OxyContin and others, while
the natural product, opium, is still prohibited. The
pharmaceutical industry is not required to show that a
product is needed or even useful—only that it is not unduly
toxic [2].
The prescription and street use of barbiturates dropped
precipitously after the introduction of a second family of
sedatives, the benzodiazepines that are said to have effects
much like alcohol. These popular drugs are sold under at
least 30 different trade names, including Librium, Valium,
Xanax, Klonopin, Tranxene, and many others [15].
In the late 1930s, Paul Charpentier, chief chemist at
Rhone-Poulenc (now Aventis) was looking for a better
antihistamine when he synthesized promethazine, but this
was believed too sedative for general use. Charpentier
synthesized several variations of the molecule and in 1952,
chlorpromazine was marketed as Largactil. In 1954, Smith,
Kline & French (now part of GSK) introduced the drug as
Thorazine. This drug proved highly useful in controlling
symptoms of psychoses and was followed by a number of
related chemicals called phenothiazines. Some of the more
profitable brands are Mellaril, Prolixin, Serentil, and
Trilafon. The subjective effects of these drugs cannot be
measured on any objective scale [16].
Withdrawal from any psychoactive drug is often
complicated by rebound, the return of whatever symptoms
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the drug had blocked. The problem of rebound, and the
addictive potential of drugs, provides the industry with a
host of life-long customers. A much more serious
consequence of alcohol and sedative use is tolerance, or
the need for increasing amounts of a drug to achieve the
desired effect. Withdrawal after tolerance has developed
runs the risk of delirium tremens, a syndrome with an
estimated fatality rate of up to 10% if not medically
managed [17].
The first synthetic stimulants came from research with
Ephedra, a plant the Chinese used to treat congestion and
fever. In 1887, Romanian chemist Lazăr Edeleanu (18611941) extracted amphetamine from the Ephedra, but the
drug seemed medically useless. In 1932, however,
American chemist Gordon Alles (1901-1963) found that
the atoms that form the amphetamine molecule are
arranged in two different ways, forming two molecules that
are mirror images, like right and left hands. The right-hand
form (dextro-amphetamine) is a powerful stimulant, while
the left-hand form (levo-amphetamine) is much less active.
Alles patented his discoveries and later sold the patent to
Smith, Kline & French (now GSK) [2, 18].
In 1933, Smith, Kline & French sold a mixture of the
two forms of amphetamine as a nasal decongestant in
Benzedrine inhalers. The company later introduced the
right-hand form (dextro-amphetamine) as Dexadrine, a
drug that was extremely popular with soldiers in World
War II. Usage fell after recognition of the drug’s addictive
potential but at least half a dozen amphetamine
preparations, including Adderal, are available on
prescription [19].
Serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSIs) have by and
large supplanted amphetamines. Serotonin is one of
several chemical neurotransmitters in the brain that carry
signals between nerve cells. The first or transmitting
nerve secretes serotonin into the space between it and the
next nerve, which is stimulated by the chemical. The
measurement of chemicals in the space between cells in
the living brain is not yet possible, and mood elevation is
presumed to be the result of the increased amount and
duration of serotonin available to the second nerve [20].
The manufacturer of the first serotonin reuptake
inhibitor, fluoxetine (Prozac), claims the drug is not
addictive—although almost anything can be—and says the
symptoms following abrupt withdrawal are not rebound,
but relapse, perhaps to suggest that depression is a disease
rather than what it is: a symptom that can be the result of
many conditions. Regardless of the name, withdrawal
from the drug can be difficult, as there have been
spontaneous reports of adverse reactions occurring upon
discontinuation of the drugs, particularly when abrupt,
including the following: dysphoric mood, irritability,
agitation, dizziness, sensory disturbance (e.g., paresthesia
such as electric shock sensations), anxiety, confusion,
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headache, lethargy, emotional lability (instability),
insomnia, and hypomania. http://pi.lilly.com/us/prozac.pdf
(para. 5-15, withdrawal).
The words brain and mind are sometimes used
interchangeably, but they are not the same thing. The brain
is an anatomical organ, like the liver, heart, or stomach, and
its anatomy has been known for centuries. Leonardo da
Vinci (1452–1519) made detailed drawings of the brain
and many areas have the Latin names given in the middle
ages (hippocampus means sea horse). The nerve
connections between the brain and the body were traced by
three outstanding 19th century physicians, Pierre Paul
Broca (1824-1880), Carl Wernicke (1848-1905), and JeanMartin Charcot (1825-1893). Charcot was the first to
distinguish between the brain and the mind, which is a
function: what the intact, conscious, and alert brain does.
MacLean’s 20th century proposal is the world’s first map
of the mind and its disorders [1].
Dr. Charcot was named Professor of Pathological
Anatomy at the University of Paris in 1872. He was then
responsible for the French asylum for destitute prostitutes,
beggars, and insane women, the Salpêtrière. Charcot
undertook the first census of the institution and he or a
colleague examined every resident and recorded the
symptoms of perhaps as many as 5,000 women [21].
The vast amount of clinical data that Charcot recorded
eventually made it possible for him to correlate a patient’s
symptoms with the pathology found in the brain at post
mortem. He was eventually able to predict, after physical
examination, just what would be found at autopsy. During
the next 20 years, Charcot converted what had been a
warehouse for unwanted women into what is today one of
Europe’s great hospitals. By1890, he was the leading
authority on diseases of the brain. Charcot established the
world’s first neurological clinic in the Salpêtrière and his
work, along with that of Broca and Wernicke, is the
foundation of the medical specialty neurology [21].
Charcot recognized and recorded the women who were
hysteric or certifiably insane (or psychotic) but he also
found some superficially hysterical women who were
excitable, anxious, depressed, obsessive, or manic, but had
none of the physical symptoms long believed to be an
essential part of the syndrome. At the beginning, he
diagnosed these women as atypical hysterias but later
coined the word neurosis to describe them. The APA now
lists hysteria as a conversion reaction and the constituent
symptoms of hysteria as separate neuroses. The
management of non-organic or functional disorders has
become the specialty of psychiatry.
Charcot used hypnotism to relieve the symptoms of
hysteria and neurosis. He displayed his technique at his
Thursday clinical lectures, which were then open to the
public. These clinics were soon so popular that Pierre
Andre Brouillet (1857-1914) painted Charcot presenting a

patient to his famous students. The painting is almost lifesize, and all of the people in it have been identified. The
patient, Marie Blanche Wittmann, is supported by Dr.
Joseph Babinski and attended by the Salpêtrière's nursing
director, Marguerite Bottard. Dr. Giles de la Tourette is
seated in the first row, wearing an apron. Charcot’s son,
later a famous oceanographer, is standing in front of a
window at the rear. The painting hangs in Museum of the
History of Medicine in Paris Descartes University [22].
Sigmund Freud graduated from the University of
Vienna medical school in 1881 and completed his thesis in
1885. He spent that winter in Paris and attended some of
Charcot’s Thursday clinics. Freud returned to Vienna in
1886, the year that Robert Louis Stevenson (1850-1894)
published The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.
The novel is the story of a London physician who believes
every person has a hidden, unconscious, and malevolent
side. Dr. Jekyll produces a chemical cocktail intended to
reveal this facet in himself. He becomes the evil, selfindulgent, and uncaring Mr. Hyde when he drinks this
concoction. The novel was an instant success, followed by
stage adaptations in Boston and London within a year
[23,24].
Six years later, in 1893, Freud published Studies on
Hysteria, followed by The Interpretation of Dreams in
1900. Over the next few years Freud produced a series of
essays in which he intended to explain how the symptoms
of hysteria (or neurosis) develop. Freud was a prolific and
persuasive author; his essays are collectively known as the
Structural Theory, which owes a lot to Stevenson, who first
published the idea of a malignant unconscious.
According to Freud, an unconscious side of the
personality (the id) exists and harbors sexual and
aggressive impulses towards the parents. The id, under the
influence of perceived social mores (the superego),
develops through specific stages (oral, anal, and phallic)
into the personality or self (ego). Neurotic disorders are the
result of arrest at, or regression to, any of these stages. This
is obviously a gross simplification of the Freudian theory,
which Kate Cambor has described as baffling jargon that
no one really understands [25].
Perhaps the first problem with Freud’s theory is that he
confuses sexual attraction with love. Sexual attraction does
not always involve love or, for that matter, even affection.
The strongest bonds of love, of a mother for her child, or
between soldiers in combat, rarely involves sexual feelings
or activity. Caroline Alexander, in a scholarly work on the
Iliad writes, the terms that define the relationship between
Patroklos and Achilles have no true counterparts in the
civilian world but belong to the enduring terminology of
war [5].
Freud cited the story of Oedipus Rex as support for his
notion of infantile sexuality, but that is a gross
misinterpretation. The tale of Oedipus has nothing to do
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with the relationship between a child and its parents. The
story is a clear illustration of the classical Greek belief that
one’s destiny is inevitable. The tale is, in fact, a bit like
Agatha Christie’s The Murder of Roger Ackroyd, in which
the investigator turns out to be the culprit [26].
Freud’s theories were rejected by both Emil Kraepelin
and Paul Eugen Bleuler, two of the leading psychiatrists of
the day (see above), and Freud’s premises—the idea of
oedipal conflict, infantile sexuality, and suppression—
have all been debunked. The public, however, was
fascinated and Dr. Hill Gates says the rapid adoption of
oedipal explanation into Western popular thought
probably owed as much to ethnographic ignorance and
prejudice as to the delightful liberation of talking trash at
the dinner table [27,28].
As mentioned at the beginning, Dr. Paul D. MacLean
suggested a classification of human mental processes
according to three factors: sequence of evolutionary
development, degree of sophistication, and sensitivity to
drugs. This systematic approach to mental functioning
suggests why disorders have traditionally been classified
as personality patterns, neuroses, or psychoses
(schizophrenias and mood disorders). It also explains why
some disorders do not respond to drug treatment, while
others are better addressed by psychologists, and it
suggests a rational means of distinguishing the disorders
which require medical management [1].
The well-known effects of alcohol (or other sedatives)
are a good illustration of Dr. MacLean’s system. Relatively
small amounts of alcohol impair our most advanced (and
probably unique) functions of intellect, conscious, reason,
and judgment. Larger amounts interfere with intermediate
abilities to which we are clearly predisposed but must
learn, such as how to walk and talk. And it explains why
drug or alcohol overdose can suppress basic operations and
be fatal [1].
Dr. MacLean classified heartbeat, respiration, and
genetically linked behaviors as basic. People are
programmed to stand up, walk, learn a language, and also
to a range of personal temperaments, including variable
degrees of sociability and aggressiveness. MacLean
compared this level of mental processing to the abilities of
reptiles, and classified it as proto-reptilian function. Vital
operations and inherent tendencies to sociability,
aggression, autism, and addiction, are resistant to drugs but
may be altered by participation in group therapy [1].
The ability to learn, store, and recall vast amounts of
information is an intermediate level of operations roughly
comparable to the mental abilities of dogs. People, as an
example, are genetically predisposed to speak a language,
but language learning requires interaction with native
speakers. Along with a language, children acquire the
social rules, opinions, and prejudices of the people with
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whom they interact. These patterns are inevitably dated,
and some are simply wrong, but children accept them
without question as reality. This vast amount of
information becomes an internal library of subconscious
patterns of thinking and behaving [2].
Some of these opinions and prejudices may come into
uncomfortable conflict with natural predispositions. This
can cause anxiety, panic, depression, and a litany of other
symptoms that are best resolved through the development
of insight. Dr. MacLean classified this level of mental
operations, roughly comparable to the intelligence of our
dogs, as paleo-mammalian [1].
Consciousness and the awareness of time are clearly
the most advanced—and probably unique—abilities of the
human mind, which Dr. MacLean called neo-mammalian
functions. It has been suggested that God's cape in
Michelangelo’s Creation of Adam on the Sistine Chapel
ceiling has the outline of the human brain and was intended
to suggest that consciousness is the final gift of Creation,
the ability that makes us fully human [1].
Take heed that you do not place your intellect, which
you have in common with the angels, below your senses,
which you have in common with brutes and plants. Pope
Gregory XI to Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II.
Children begin to be aware of themselves as separate
individuals when they are about two years old, and practice
saying ‘no’, but the awareness of time doesn’t usually
develop until at about age seven, when they are able to
consider the consequences of their actions. This stage of
development may be marked by a child’s first use of future
and conditional verb tenses.
The ability to evaluate what we see, say, and hear is a
unique human faculty. Impairment of one or more of these
senses, in the form of visual or auditory hallucinations,
pressured speech, or paucity of speech, is often the
outstanding characteristic of what were once called
madness or psychosis, and are now discussed as
schizophrenias and affective disorders. Perhaps by
coincidence, the three wise monkeys on the Toshogu
Shrine north of Tokyo—see no evil, speak no evil, and hear
no evil—represent these abilities [2].
Three important senses—of taste, touch, and smell—
have powerful emotional impact but are rarely involved in
functional psychoses; hallucinations involving any of these
senses suggest the presence of physical disease. George
Gershwin, during a January 1937 concert in Los Angeles,
stumbled on an easy passage and later told a friend that he
had experienced a curious odor of some burning smell.
Gershwin consulted a psychiatrist, but died of a brain
tumor later that year [29].
The MacLean classification offers guidelines to
distinguish between inherent tendencies, neuroses, and
psychoses, and suggests which treatment approach is
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appropriate in each. Problems that seem to be genetically
linked, such as behavioral tendencies, addiction, and
autism, are best managed in group therapy. Neuroses that
appear to be the result of unacceptable feelings can be
blocked by drugs but are best resolved though the
resolution of internal conflict through therapy [1,2].

Conclusions
Disorders that impair intellectual abilities—
consciousness, vision, hearing, or speech—generally
require medical management. The diagnosis should
encourage search for causes and to that end should include
a detailed history of family. Similar problems in relatives
suggest a genetic link. Onset in the early twenties—when
there are many social contacts—suggests the possibility of
contagion. Environmental contaminants have been
implicated and should be investigated in any case of
psychosis. If none of these seems likely, this should be
noted for further investigation.
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